No Hope for Redemption: The False Choice Between Safety and Justice in Hope VI Ex-Offender Admissions Policies by Donovan, Kathleen F.
DePaul Journal for Social Justice 
Volume 3 
Issue 2 Spring 2010 Article 4 
January 2016 
No Hope for Redemption: The False Choice Between Safety and 
Justice in Hope VI Ex-Offender Admissions Policies 
Kathleen F. Donovan 
Follow this and additional works at: https://via.library.depaul.edu/jsj 
Recommended Citation 
Kathleen F. Donovan, No Hope for Redemption: The False Choice Between Safety and Justice in Hope VI 
Ex-Offender Admissions Policies, 3 DePaul J. for Soc. Just. 173 (2010) 
Available at: https://via.library.depaul.edu/jsj/vol3/iss2/4 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the College of Law at Via Sapientiae. It has been 
accepted for inclusion in DePaul Journal for Social Justice by an authorized editor of Via Sapientiae. For more 
information, please contact digitalservices@depaul.edu. 
NO HOPE FOR REDEMPTION: THE
FALSE CHOICE BETWEEN SAFETY AND




Since the beginning of America's current real estate-fueled
recession, the nation's focus has been on one of our most limited
resources-affordable housing. As unemployment and foreclo-
sure rates rose during 2008 and the beginning of 2009,1 major
cities reported large increases in homelessness.2 The economic
* J.D. Candidate, Notre Dame Law School, 2010; B.B.A. in Finance, Univer-
sity of Texas at Austin, 2007. Special thanks to my parents, Dan and Carol
Donovan, for their support and advice; to my brother, Patrick Donovan, for
his helpful comments; to Kenneth Coffin for his thoughtful editing and en-
couragement; and to the staff of the DePaul Journal for Social Justice.
1 In January 2009, American employers cut 598,000 jobs, resulting in the
largest monthly job cut since 1974. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S.
DEPT. OF LABOR, THE EMPLOYMENT SITUATION: JANUARY 2009 (2009). The
unemployment rate currently sits at 9.8%. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS,
U.S. DEPT. OF LABOR, THE EMPLOYMENT SITUATION: SEPTEMBER 2009
(2009). Over two million foreclosure proceedings were filed in 2008, an 81%
increase over the number filed in 2007. Foreclosure Filings Up 81% in 2008,
WALL ST. J., Jan. 15, 2009, http://www.grubbellis-ny.com/2009Articles/1-15-
08/WSJ% 20- %20Foreclosure %20Filings %2OUp %2081 % 20in %202008.pdf.
More recently, one out of every 136 households in the United States received
a foreclosure notice in the months of July, August, and September 2009. US
Econ: Q3 Foreclosure Rate Up 5% to Record High, FORBES, Oct. 14, 2009,
http://www.forbes.com/feeds/afx/2009/10/15/afx7003244.html.
2 Trymaine Lee, Families With Children in City Shelters Soar to Record Level,
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 22, 2008, at A27 ("The number of homeless families with
children entering New York City shelters hit a record high last month, climb-
ing more than 40 percent from the same period last year."); Lisa Black, More
Economic Fallout: Homelessness in Students, CHI. TRIB., Feb. 13, 2009, § 4, at
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downturn will likely put further stress on the already strained
public housing supply, as more and more Americans seek access
to affordable housing. For Americans with the lowest incomes,
federally subsidized public housing is one of the only viable op-
tions.3 Current public housing options, however, cannot provide
sufficient housing units required by the growing number of
Americans in need of these services.4
Despite the recent focus on these issues, the United States has
faced a crisis in affordable housing availability for decades. In
fact, "[slince 1937, when the first federal legislation was enacted
to provide housing for low income people, there has been an
acknowledged crisis in affordable housing." 5 The Department of
Housing and Urban Development (HUD) estimates that less
than one-third of the 15 million Americans eligible for public
housing receive federally-subsidized assistance.6 The conse-
quences of this shortage are increased homelessness, long wait-
1 (discussing the 67% rise in the number of students in Chicago schools who
are homeless).
3 JoINT CENTER FOR HOUSING STUDIES, HARVARD UNIVERSITY, MEETING
MULTIFAMILY HOUSING FINANCE NEEDS DURING AND AFTER THE CREDIT
CRISIS: A POLICY BRIEF 3 (describing the lack of available affordable multi-
family rental housing in the United States, as well as the number of Ameri-
cans in need of such housing). "[A] staggering 79 percent of multifamily
renters in the lowest quartile and 45 percent in the lower-middle income
quartile spend more than half their income on housing." Id.
4 For example, the New York City Housing Authority (NYCHA), the largest
public housing authority in the United States, reported that as of January 31,
2010, their waitlist consisted of over 130,000 families. These families are wait-
ing for one of the 178,556 apartments run by the NYCHA, though it is un-
likely they will get off the waitlist soon because of the authority's small
3.21% turnover rate. N.Y. City Hous. Auth., About NYCHA (2010), http://
www.nyc.gov/html/nycha/html/about/factsheet.shtml.
5 Paulette J. Williams, The Continuing Crisis in Affordable Housing: Sys-
temic Issues Requiring Systemic Solutions, 31 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 413, 415
(2004).
6 Peter W. Salsich, Jr., Welfare Reform: Is Self Sufficiency Feasible Without
Affordable Housing, 2 MICH. L. & POL'Y REV. 43, 56 (1997).
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ing lists,7 and stringent admission policies by public housing
authorities (PHAs) .8
These admission policies have become increasingly important
in the 21st Century since the implementation of HOPE VI, a
"program provid[ing] grants to public housing authorities to de-
molish severely distressed public housing units."9 HOPE VI,
which was permanently authorized in the Quality Housing and
Work Responsibility Act of 1998,10 eliminated the historical
"one for one" replacement requirement, mandating that PHAs
replace each demolished housing unit with a new unit." Instead,
under HOPE VI, eliminated units are only partially replaced by
units in new mixed-income projects.12 Consequently, the imple-
mentation of HOPE VI has resulted in an overall decrease in
public housing units in some cities, coupled with a decrease in
the percentage of units available to the neediest families.13 "Chi-
cago's HOPE VI, 'Plan for Transformation,' is arguably the
country's most ambitious recent public housing reform plan."14
For this reason, this article will use the "Plan for Transforma-
tion" as the primary example of the policies and realities of
HOPE VI public housing.
7 For example, Chicago's waiting list contains 56,000 families, and the list has
been closed since 2001. Jason Grotto, Laurie Cohen, & Sara Olkon, Public
Housing Limbo, CHI. TRIB., Jul. 6, 2008, at 1.
8 William C. Nussbaum, Public Housing: Choosing Among Families in Need
of Housing, 77 Nw. U. L. REV. 700, 700 (1982).
9 Williams, supra note 5, at 439.
10 Quality Housing and Work Responsibility Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-
276, tit. V, § 535, 112 Stat. 2461, 2518 (2000) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1437
(2000)).
11 Nicole Stelle Garnett, Relocating Disorder, 91 VA. L. REv. 1075, 1110
(2005).
12 Id. at 1109.
13 For example, under Chicago's "Plan for Transformation," the total num-
ber of public housing units will be reduced by 13,000. Lisa T. Alexander, A
Sociological History of Public Housing Reform in Chicago, 17 J. AFFORDA-
BLE Hous. & CMTY DEV. L. 155, 160 (2008).
14 Id. at 155.
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One of the many admissions policies used to weed through
applicants is the denial of public housing to applicants who have
a criminal background.15 PHAs are authorized by HUD to
screen for "[a] history of criminal activity involving crimes of
physical violence to persons or property and other criminal acts
which would adversely affect the health, safety or welfare of
other tenants." 16 PHAs apply the HUD application standards
with varying levels of stringency, with some issuing blanket ex-
clusions to tenants who commit specific offenses for a set period
of years.' Additionally, under the "one-strike-and-you're-out"
policy advocated by President Clinton in the heat of the "War
on Drugs," PHAs utilize and enforce strict eviction rules for te-
nants who use drugs or commit crimes during their tenancy.'8
These exclusionary policies are typically justified by the PHAs'
responsibility to provide "decent and safe" public housing for all
tenants.19
This article advocates a change to exclusionary policies that
deny public housing admission to ex-offenders. Such policies run
contrary to the general purpose of public housing, they do not
adequately accomplish their goal of making public housing and
the surrounding communities safer, and they are far too punitive
while lacking justification under any traditional theory of crimi-
nal punishment. In sum, the few benefits of these exclusionary
15 Nussbaum, supra note 8, at 710 n.63 (identifying the authority of PHAs to
look at criminal background information).
16 24 C.F.R. § 960.203(c)(3) (2008).
17 HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, No SECOND CHANCE: PEOPLE WITH CRIMINAL
RECORDS DENIED ACCESS TO PUBLIC HOUSING (2004), reprinted in Corinne
A. Carey, No Second Chance: People with Criminal Records Denied Access to
Public Housing, 36 U. TOL. L. REV. 545, 569 (2005) [hereinafter No Second
Chance]. But see Letter from Sunia Zaterman, Executive Director, Council of
Large Public Housing Authorities, to Corinne A. Carey, U.S. Program of
Human Rights Watch (Dec. 9, 2004) (arguing that the assertions in Ms. Ca-
rey's article are misrepresentations).
18 Barclay Thomas Johnson, The Severest Justice Is Not the Best Policy: The
One-Strike Policy in Public Housing, 10 J. AFFORDABLE Hous. & CMTY
DEV. L. 234, 235 (2001).
19 No Second Chance, supra note 17, at 560.
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policies are outweighed by the unfair burden placed on appli-
cants with criminal backgrounds.
In analyzing exclusionary housing policies, it is necessary to
look first to the development of public housing laws in the U.S.
Part I will describe the evolution of federally funded and subsi-
dized housing in the U.S., and current exclusionary policies that
deny admission to ex-offenders. Part 1I will seek to show that
excluding applicants with criminal backgrounds does not ade-
quately serve either of the public housing goals of providing
housing for Americans in need or providing for the safety of
housing tenants. Finally, Part III will evaluate the punitive effect
of the exclusionary admission policies and argue that these poli-
cies lack grounding in the traditional theories of criminal pun-
ishment. In closing, this article proposes some reforms to
housing policies to bring them in line with the goals of public
housing and limit the punitive impact on ex-offenders.
I. DEVELOPMENT AND CURRENT STATE OF THE LAW
Responding to the economic blight created by the Great De-
pression,20 the U.S. initiated its first public housing program
with the passage of the Housing Act of 1937 (1937 Act).21 The
1937 Act was intended "to assist the several States and their po-
litical subdivisions" in addressing, among other things, "the
acute shortage of decent, safe, and sanitary dwellings for fami-
lies of low income." 22 The system was designed so that local
PHAs must apply for funding from the federal government, in
order to receive the capital financing needed to develop public
20 MICHAEL E. STONE, SOCIAL HOUSING IN THE UK AND US: EVOLUTION,
ISSUES AND PROSPECTS (Oct. 2003), http://www.cpcs.umb.edu/-mstone/
Stone-UKSocHousingOct03.pdf; Williams, supra note 5, at 427.
21 Housing Act of 1937, Pub. L. No. 75-412, 50 Stat. 888 (1937) (current ver-
sion at 42 U.S.C. § 1437 (2000)).
22 Id. at 888.
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housing projects.23 In return for the government's role in "un-
derwriting the full capital cost of the development," the PHAs
agreed to federal regulatory oversight.24 Interestingly, Congress
chose this format in response to federal court rulings holding
that the acquisition of land by the federal government for public
housing violated the Takings Clause.25 As a result, Congress
vested the primary responsibility for development of public
housing projects in local PHAs, which are "municipal corpora-
tion[s] created pursuant to state enabling legislation." 26
Twelve years later, Congress followed with its second major
piece of housing legislation, the Housing Act of 1949.27 Congress
recognized the "serious housing shortage" in the U.S. and stated
that the general welfare required "the realization ... of a decent
home and suitable living environment for every American fam-
ily."2 8 At the same time, however, Congress also initiated the
seemingly competing agendas of slum clearance and urban rede-
velopment.29 It is important to note that even early housing leg-
islation recognized the trade-off between providing housing for
23 Id. at 891. See Michael H. Schill, Distressed Public Housing: Where Do We
Go From Here?, 60 U. CHI. L. REv. 497, 499-500 (1993) [hereinafter Schill,
Distressed Housing], for a good description of how the 1937 program was
designed to work.
24 Schill, Distressed Housing, supra note 23, at 499-500; see also Stone, supra
note 20, at 6-7 (providing a brief description of the program developed by the
Housing Act of 1937).
25 United States v. Certain Lands in Louisville, 78 F2d 684, 687 (6th Cir.
1935); Schill, Distressed Housing, supra note 23, at 499 n.12.
26 Schill, Distressed Housing, supra note 23, at 499 n.11.
27 Housing Act of 1949, Pub. L. No. 81-171, 63 Stat. 413 (1949).
28 Id. at 413.
29 Id.; See also Williams, supra note 5, at 427 (calling the goals of providing
housing for low income families and achieving slum clearance "somewhat
contradictory purposes"); Michael Schill, Privatizing Federal Low Income
Housing Assistance: The Case of Public Housing, 75 CORNELL L. REV. 878,
904 (1990) [hereinafter Schill, Privatizing Housing] (explaining why these
two goals are contradictory and how slum clearance became the focus and
priority of the 1949 and 1954 housing legislation).
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all needy Americans and providing housing that was free of the
dangers associated with urban slums.
The Department of Housing and Urban Development Act of
1965 created a cabinet-level agency to administer the public
housing program.30 HUD exists today as the regulatory body
that guides PHAs in the administration of their housing pro-
grams. 31 After Congress recognized "the increasing importance
of housing and urban development in our national life" in
1965,32 President Nixon halted construction of federal housing
projects by declaring a "moratorium" in 1973.33 Responding to
pressure from the real estate and construction industries that
were concerned that federal housing was too competitive with
the private market,34 Congress passed the Housing and Commu-
nity Development Act of 1974 (1974 Act).35 The 1974 Act initi-
ated the Section 8 Housing Assistance Program (Section 8), a
private market solution to the federal housing program problem
that subsidized low-income housing developed by private own-
ers.3 6 In addition, the 1974 Act created a tenant-based housing
program, through which individual tenants could rent apart-
ments from private owners with the use of Section 8 subsidies37
30 Department of Housing and Urban Development Act of 1965, Pub. L. No.
89-174, § 3, 79 Stat. 667 (1965) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 3531 (2000)).
31 No Second Chance, supra note 17, at 561.
32 Department of Housing and Urban Development Act of 1965 § 3, supra
note 30 at 667-668.
33 Williams, supra note 5, at 430 (discussing the circumstances leading to the
moratorium and why public housing was so controversial in the 1970s).
34 Id. at 429.
35 Housing and Community Development Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-383,
§ 201(a), 88 Stat. 633 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1437f (2000)).
36 Williams, supra note 5, at 430. The project-based assistance portion of the
1974 Act, which provided funds for the development of public housing
projects by private developers, is no longer an extremely relevant portion of
the Act. "After 1981, no new project-based subsidies were authorized." Id. at
440.
37 DEPARTMENT OF HOUSING AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT, SECTION 8 TEN-
ANT-BASED HOUSING ASSISTANCE: A LOOK BACK AFTER 30 YEARS 5
(2000) [hereinafter HUD, SECTION 8]. The rent subsidy was originally set so
Volume 3, Number 2 Spring zo1o
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The Section 8 program was expanded under the Department of
Housing and Community Development Act of 1987 (1987
Act). 3 The 1987 Act adjustments gave families added flexibility
and freedom to choose more costly apartments-despite the
government subsidy remaining the same-and apartments
outside the jurisdiction of the issuing PHA.39
The most recent large-scale change to the public housing pro-
gram came in 1993, when Congress codified HUD's HOPE VI
program.40 The program aims to replace distressed public hous-
ing units with newer housing in mixed-income developments.41
HOPE VI faces criticism for several reasons: the lack of a one-
for-one replacement of units,42 the potential that new units will
be too expensive for existing public housing tenants,43 and the
that tenants would pay 15-25% of their income toward their apartment rent,
but this amount was later raised to 30%. Id.
38 Department of Housing and Community Development Act of 1987, Pub.
L. No. 96-399, 101 Stat. 1815 (1988) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.
§ 1437f(o) (2000)). Note that the Quality Housing and Work Responsibility
Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-276, tit. V, § 535, 112 Stat. 2461, 2518 (1998)
(codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1437f (2000)), consolidated the Section 8 certificate
and voucher programs. See also HUD, SECTION 8, supra note 37, at 6 (dis-
cussing the "streamlining" of the certificate and voucher programs).
39 HUD, SEcTION 8, supra note 37, at 5-6.
40 Appropriations Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 102-389, tit. II, 106 Stat. 1571,
1579-81 (1992) (codified as amended in 42 U.S.C. § 1437 (1996) (repealed
1998). Permanent funding for HOPE VI was provided through the Quality
Housing and Work Responsibility Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-276, tit. V,
§ 535, 112 Stat. 2461, 2581 (1998) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1437v (2000)).
41 Garnett, supra note 11, at 1110-11; Susan J. Popkin, No Simple Solutions:
Housing CHA's Most Vulnerable Families, 1 Nw. J. L. & Soc. POL'Y 148,
150-151 (2006).
42 Garnett, supra note 11, at 1110-11 ("Perhaps most significantly, the 1998
Act eliminated the requirement that public-housing authorities replace de-
molished public-housing on a one-for-one basis, thus clearing the way for the
demolition of high-rise projects and their replacement with privately man-
aged, less dense, mixed-income developments."); see also Alexander, supra
note 13, at 166.
43 Williams, supra note 5, at 439 (discussing several criticisms of the HOPE
VI program, such as that the new housing will be "financially out of the reach
of the people who were displaced.").
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reality that some new units will be unavailable to the neediest
tenants based on the mixed-income nature of the project.4 4
The Chicago Housing Authority's (CHA) "Plan for Transfor-
mation" 45 provides an illustrative look at the problems that arise
from HOPE VI reformation plans.46 The CHA's plan is typical
of the HOPE VI mixed-income replacement model. It aims to
replace high-rise public housing projects with low-rise buildings
and townhomes, approximately 30% of which will be located in
mixed-income developments.47 The demolition of old units was
justified based on the physical state of the high-rises, 48 the high
concentration of poverty and crime,49 and criticisms of racial
segregation.50 Despite its laudable goals, Chicago's plan fails in
one major respect: it reduces Chicago's public housing stock by
44 For example, Chicago's HOPE VI Plan for Transformation includes de-
signs for mixed-income development that will reserve only 1/3 of its units for
public housing tenants. The remainder of the units are split between individu-
als with incomes between 50-80% of the median county income and individu-
als earning over 80% of the median county income. Alexander, supra note
13, at 160 and 166.
45 The CHA's Plan for Transformation, http://www.thecha.org/transform
plan/plan-summary.html (2010) [hereinafter CHA's Plan] (describing the
Plan for Transformation).
46 Alexander, supra note 13, at 155 ("Chicago's HOPE VI, 'Plan for Trans-
formation,' is arguably this country's most ambitious recent public housing
reform plan given the number of units being demolished and rebuilt, as well
as the complex network of public and private partnerships the plan necessi-
tates."); Popkin, supra note 41, at 151 (reflecting on Chicago's status as hav-
ing the worst distressed public housing in the nation).
47 CHA's Plan, supra note 45. "These MIXED-INCOME developments gener-
ally consist of one-third public housing, one-third affordable housing, and
one-third market rate homes." Molly Thompson, Relocating from the Distress
of Chicago Public Housing to the Difficulties of the Private Market: How the
Move Threatens to Push Families Away From Opportunity, 1 Nw. J. L. & Soc.
POL'Y 267, 275.
48 CHI. Hous. AUTH., PLAN FOR TRANSFORMATION: IMPROVING PUBLIC
HOUSING IN CHICAGO AND THE QUALITY OF LIFE 7 (JAN. 2000), available at
http://www.thecha.org/filebin/pdf/FY2000-Annual-Plan.pdf (describing the
pre-plan state of housing as "physically obsolete"),
49 Garnett, supra note 11, at 1109-10.
50 Grotto et al., supra note 7.
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13,000 units.51 This number does not completely reflect the num-
ber of displaced public housing residents, however, because only
one-third of the 25,000 new units will be available for public
housing residents. 52 Further, delays in production of new units
because of government inefficiencies and the recent housing
market crash have only exacerbated the situation, as many of
the old units have already been demolished.53
In addition to displacing current public housing residents, the
program imposes higher standards on current residents seeking
mixed-income site housing. These site-based selection criteria
are in addition to, not in replacement of, the initial PHA re-
quirements.54 Few public housing residents meet screening crite-
ria for these mixed-income sites.55 For displaced residents
unable to meet mixed-income development screening criteria,
Chicago's plan, like many HOPE VI plans, offers Section 8
vouchers or the opportunity to move to another public housing
project.56
The development of housing laws in the U.S. highlights both
the lack of adequate public housing to shelter low income fami-
lies, as well as the government's interest in reducing crime and
promoting safety in public housing. Recent HOPE VI measures
indicate that current public policy favors housing that avoids a
51 Alexander, supra note 13, at 160. For example, the Robert Taylor Homes,
once the nation's largest public housing development, was chosen by the
CHA for demolition under the federal government's "Hope VI" program.
Garnett, supra note 11, at 1108-09.
52 Alexander, supra note 13, at 160.
53 Grotto et al., supra note 7. Some developments have bank loans that re-
quire 50% of the market rate homes to be sold before construction can be
initiated. After the recession began, it became impossible to sell these new
homes, preventing the start of construction on even the public housing por-
tion of the development. Id.
54 Chicago Housing Authority, Frequently Asked Questions, http://www.
thecha.org/pages/_faqs/94.php.
s5 Popkin, supra note 41, at 152.
56 Chicago Housing Authority, Understanding Relocation, http://66.99.87.40/
relocation/overview.html; Garnett, supra note 11, at 1111.
Volume 5, Number 2 Spring zo1o
10
DePaul Journal for Social Justice, Vol. 3, Iss. 2 [2016], Art. 4
https://via.library.depaul.edu/jsj/vol3/iss2/4
concentration of poor residents in an effort to promote the
safety of the residents able to acquire a coveted spot in the new
mixed-income developments.57 HUD and PHAs justify exclu-
sionary admission policies targeting individuals with criminal
backgrounds based on this same logic. 58 HOPE VI has increased
the importance on these exclusionary policies in traditional pub-
lic housing because of the reduction in the overall number of
units and the strengthening of admissions requirements. The
Section 8 voucher remedy is also problematic due to its reliance
on the private market, which provides its own unpredictable
limitations on the admissibility of ex-offenders. An analysis of
exclusionary policies can best be broken down into those affect-
ing traditional public housing and those affecting the Section 8
voucher program.
A. Exclusionary Policies in Traditional Public
Housing Programs 59
Exclusionary policies in traditional public housing come in
two forms: policies excluding ex-offenders at the application
phase and policies allowing for the eviction of tenants who com-
mit crimes during their tenancy.
57 See Garnett, supra note 11, at 1109-11 (discussing the policies behind
HOPE VI, and the Chicago Plan for Transformation).
ss Manigo v. New York City Hous. Auth., 273 N.Y.S.2d 1003, 1004 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. 1966) ("Without a proper screening of prospective tenants the dan-
gers to those persons residing therein would be multiplied many times
over."); Michael Pinard & Anthony C. Thompson, Offender Reentry and the
Collateral Consequences of Criminal Convictions: An Introduction, 30 N.Y.U.
REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 585, 594 (2006) [hereinafter Pinard, Offender Reen-
try] (arguing that in some ways the exclusionary policies make sense because
they are "designed to ensure safety of public housing tenants by empowering
officials to remove a current threat").
59 This note uses the term "traditional public housing" to describe both the
older high-rise projects developed under the original housing laws and the
new mixed-income developments created under HOPE VI.
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1. Exclusionary Admissions Policies
The Code of Federal Regulations (The Code) provides gui-
dance to PHAs in developing admission criteria for public hous-
ing.60 The Code advises PHAs to evaluate each family's
suitability for tenancy in public housing based on a variety of
factors.61 In determining suitability for tenancy, the PHA is re-
quired to consider whether any of the family members have "[a]
history of criminal activity involving crimes of physical violence
to persons or property and other criminal acts which would ad-
versely affect the health, safety or welfare of other tenants." 62
Legislation provides that the National Crime Information
Center and law enforcement agencies will make criminal
records available to PHAs upon request for the purpose of assis-
tance in admission screening and eviction. 63
Despite the suggested screening requirements, Congress also
mandated a case-by-case analysis based on the "time, nature,
and the extent of the applicant's conduct (including the serious-
ness of the offense)."64 The guidelines suggest that PHAs look
to the likelihood of future offenses based on evidence of
rehabilitation and willingness to cooperate with counseling
services.65 There are only two crimes that carry automatic
lifetime bans from federal housing: crimes resulting in lifetime
registration on a state sex offender registration program66
60 24 C.F.R. § 960.203 (2003).
61 Id. (providing the following factors for guidance: ability to pay rent and
other financial obligations; history of disturbance, destruction of property,
and poor housekeeping; and history of criminal activity).
62 24 C.F.R. § 960.203(c)(3) (2003).
63 42 U.S.C. § 1437d(q)(1)(A) (2000); 24 C.F.R. § 5.903(a)-(c) (2003). There
are limitations on the availability of juvenile criminal records. 42 U.S.C.
§ 1437d(q)(1)(C). The release of juvenile record information must be author-
ized by applicable State and local law. Id.
64 24 C.F.R. § 960.203(d)(1) (2003).
65 Id.
66 42 U.S.C. § 13663(a) (2000).
Volume), Number 2
DePaul Journal for Social Justice 18+
Spring zo1o
12
DePaul Journal for Social Justice, Vol. 3, Iss. 2 [2016], Art. 4
https://via.library.depaul.edu/jsj/vol3/iss2/4
and conviction for the manufacture and production of
methamphetamine. 67
Aside from these guidelines, "Congress gave vast discretion to
local housing authorities to establish their own eligibility stan-
dards regarding criminal records." 68 As a result, PHA-mandated
admissions requirements vary greatly based on locality. Al-
though many PHAs do not completely advertise their admission
standards, a recent Legal Action Center study on the obstacles
to prisoner reentry details the admission policies of the major
housing authorities in each state and the District of Columbia. 69
The study highlights restrictive policies in PHAs across the
country. Although the two largest city PHAs, New York and
Chicago, do not base admission decisions on arrests that do not
result in conviction, many PHAs do consider arrests them-
selves.70 Housing authorities in Atlanta, Birmingham, Indianap-
olis, Las Vegas, Newark, Philadelphia, Salt Lake City, and
elsewhere allow a prior arrest without conviction to impact an
67 24 C.F.R. § 966.4(l)(5)(i)(A) (2006). Methamphetamine carries conse-
quences that are more severe than other drug-related offenses because of the
volatile production process, which often results in unsafe living conditions
and risk of explosion.
68 Michael Pinard, An Integrated Perspective on the Collateral Consequences
of Criminal Convictions and Reentry Issues Faced by Formerly Incarcerated
Individuals, 86 B.U. L. REV. 623, 638 (2006) [hereinafter Pinard, Integrated
Perspective] (discussing the wide discretion given to PHAs in determining
admissions standards, and how this has led to a massive increase in collateral
consequences for ex-offenders).
69 Legal Action Center, After Prison: Roadblocks to Reentry, http://www.
lac.org/roadblocks-to-reentry/index.php [hereinafter Roadblocks to Reentry].
The Roadblocks to Reentry study was completed in 2004, but Legal Action
Center has updated the study to include changes in state law as these changes
have come to their attention. The study contains state law material on sub-
jects other than housing; however, the housing material is easily accessible.
The "What's the Law" tab will navigate to a page where it is possible to look
up the relevant laws and regulations by state. Id.
70 Id.; see also Council of Large Public Housing Associations, Largest PHAs
by Unit, http://www.clpha.org/page.cfm?pagelD=490 (listing the largest
PHAs by unit size, and ranking New York and Chicago as the largest two city
PHAs).
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applicant's admissibility for public housing.7 ' Additionally,
PHAs in Minnesota consider arrests if there have been a pattern
of arrests in individuals' criminal history, while the District of
Columbia considers arrests for certain offenses, such as drug-
related and violent offenses, sex offenses, and offenses against
people and property.72
Many PHAs have admission standards that completely bar
applicants who committed certain crimes from receiving public
housing for a certain number of years. Because of the latitude
given to PHAs discretion, there is wide variation in the number
of years an applicant can be barred, as well as the types of
crimes that warrant a bar.73 For example, PHAs in Atlanta, Bos-
ton, Dallas, the District of Columbia, and Los Angeles utilize no
specific time bars.74 Other cities, including Chicago, Detroit,
Philadelphia, and Salt Lake City only employ bars for applicants
71 Roadblocks to Reentry, supra note 69; see also ATLANTA HOUSING Au-
THORITY, APPLICATION FOR HOUSING 4, available at http://www.atlanta
housing.org/pdfs/Leasing %20Application-Online-070105-Family%2OCommu
nities.pdf (asking applicants to explain any past criminal history, including
arrests); Housing Authority of the Birmingham District, How Families are
Selected to Participate, http://www.habd.org/Housing%20Management.htm
("All family members must be clear of any history of criminal activity involv-
ing drug or alcohol abuse or crimes of physical violence to persons or prop-
erty."); INDIANAPOLIS HOUSING AGENCY, THE GEORGETOWN ADMISSIONS
& CONTINUED OCCUPANCY POLICY 19, available at www.indyhousing.org/
ACOP%20-%2OGeorgetown.pdf (providing the agency's admissions stan-
dards and indicating that applicants who have been "convicted of, or arrested
in connection with" crimes such as drug distribution, assault, theft, fraud, and
disturbance of the peace may be denied public housing) (emphasis added).
72 Roadblocks to Reentry, supra note 69; see also MINNEAPOLIS PUBLIC
HOUSING AUTHORITY, STATEMENT OF POLICIES 18-20, available at http://
www.mphaonline.org/Docs/Statement%20of%20Policies %20_ACOP_%20
Final%207-08.pdf; DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA HOUSING AUTHORITY, APPLICA-
TION FOR HOUSING ASSISTANCE 2, available at http://www.dchousing.org/
docs/HousingApplication.pdf (inquiring into the past arrest history of family
members applying for public housing).
73 See Roadblocks to Reentry, supra note 69.
74 Id.; see also HOUSING AUTHORITY OF THE CITY OF Los ANGELES, ADMIS-
SIONS AND CONTINUED OCCUPANCY POLICY 6-7 (2007), available at http://
www.hacla.org/attachments/wysiwyg/10/ACOPPlan2008.pdf (describing the
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who committed drug-related or violent offenses.75 These bars
are arguably the most relevant because of the consensus that
they are most harmful to the safety and health of other re-
sidents. 76 One drug possession conviction will result in bars from
public housing in Seattle and in Norfolk.77
The most troubling bars are those attached to offenses that
are neither violent nor drug-related. It is difficult to see how
these crimes can be justified on the basis of the health and safety
of other residents. For example, a single prostitution offense car-
ries a bar between two and five years with the Seattle Housing
Authority.78 In PHAs in Virginia, public urination and "immoral
conduct" carry bars between three and 10 years.79 Finally, some
bars are suspect simply because of their length. Drug trafficking
carries a 10-year ban in Birmingham, and arson carries a lifetime
ban in Chicago.80
HACLA's inquiries into applicants' criminal backgrounds, but not indicating
any specific time bars or outright denials for applicants).
75 Roadblocks to Reentry, supra note 69. Chicago, Detroit, and Philadelphia
have three-year bars for these offenses, and Salt Lake City has a ten year bar.
Id.
76 Pinard, Offender Reentry, supra note 58 and accompanying text.
77 Roadblocks to Reentry, supra note 69. The Seattle PHA imposes a two to
five year bar for drug possession. Id. But see Seattle Housing Authority, Eli-
gibility, http://www.seattlehousing.org/housing/ipm/eligibility/ (indicating that
the time bar for drug possession is two years but substance delivery will bar
an applicant for five years). A single drug possession conviction will result in
a three year bar in Norfolk, but multiple convictions will increase the ban to
five or ten years, depending on the conviction number. Roadblocks to Reen-
try, supra note 69. Additionally, PHAs in Ohio impose three-year bars for
drug-related misdemeanors. Id.
78 Roadblocks to Reentry, supra note 69.
79 Id. Virginia also bars applicants with multiple convictions for forgery,
shoplifting, and altering prices for a period between three and five years. Id.
80 Roadblocks to Reentry, supra note 69.
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2. Exclusionary Eviction Policies8l
HUD guidelines call for PHA lease provisions to require te-
nants to refrain from criminal activity, drug-related criminal ac-
tivity and drug or alcohol abuse on or off the premises under
threat of eviction. 82 Congress enacted the "one-strike-and-
you're-out" statute83 in 1996 as an "anti-crime measure" to solve
the issues of rampant crime in public housing. 84 "The statute
provides for the eviction of tenants living in housing projects
funded by the Federal government, or otherwise receiving Fed-
eral housing assistance, if they . . . engage in certain types of
criminal activity on, and in some cases, off, the public housing
premises."85 Moreover, in grading the PHAs, HUD awards
points to those PHAs that can show that they have policies and
procedures in place to evict such violators. 86
In Lowell Hous. Auth. v. Melendez, the Supreme Judicial
Court of Massachusetts upheld the eviction of a public housing
tenant for the robbery of a convenience store located one mile
from the housing project.8 Rejecting the tenant's claim that a
crime committed off of the public housing site could not
81 This Note will primarily focus on exclusionary admissions policies, rather
than exclusionary eviction policies. It is important to recognize the impact of
exclusionary eviction policies on public housing residents. However, they are
less suspect because individuals who commit crimes while residents of
publicly-assisted housing violate the leases that are signed with the PHAs.
See infra note 83 and accompanying text. Additionally, they are not
speculative in nature like the admissions policies, which essentially predict
criminal behavior based on past criminal actions. Crimes committed during
tenancy pose threats to other residents at that moment, and thus eviction
based on these crimes is not speculative of future criminal activity.
82 24 C.F.R. § 966.4(f)(12) (2003) (itemizing tenant obligations under PHA
leases relating to criminal activity and behavior).
83 42 U.S.C. § 1437d(1)(6) (2000); see also supra note 18 and accompanying
text.
84 Lowell Hous. Auth. v. Melendez, 865 N.E.2d 741, 743 (Mass. 2007).
85 Id.
86 24 C.F.R. § 966.4(l)(5)(vii)(A) (2003).
87 Lowell Hous. Auth., 865 N.E.2d at 741-42.
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"threaten the health, safety, or right to quiet enjoyment of other
tenants,"88 the court ruled that certain types of criminal activity
are so violent or dangerous that they threaten and incite fear in
tenants forced to live near the actor. 89 Further, the court noted
that the Massachusetts version of the "one-strike" law stipulates
that tenants facing eviction for such activities are not entitled to
an eviction hearing, a common right of tenants facing eviction. 90
Eviction guidelines also call for tenants to prevent other
household members and guests from engaging in similar crimi-
nal activities.91 These control requirements are the focus of
much legal scholarship and litigation. The Supreme Court inter-
preted these lease regulations as containing a strict liability, or
no fault, requirement.92 According to the Court in Department
of Housing and Urban Development v. Rucker, the Code's plain
language "requires leases that grant public housing authorities
the discretion to terminate tenancy without regard to the ten-
ant's knowledge of the drug-related criminal activity." 93 The
Court expressed approval for this lease requirement, citing the
benefits of deterrence and efficient enforcement.94
Despite PHA authority to develop strict eviction policies,
Congress indicated that it still expected a case-by-case analysis.
Because the PHA is in the best position to judge the pros and
cons of an eviction, each potential eviction must be reviewed by
the PHA.95 The federal regulations clearly indicate, moreover,
that eviction is an available, but not mandatory, remedy. Evi-
dence of this can be found in the language of the federal regula-
88 Id. at 742.
89 Id. at 744-45.
90 Id. at 744.
91 24 C.F.R. § 966.4(f)(12) (2003).
92 Dept. of Hous. & Urban Dev. v. Rucker, 535 U.S. 125 (2002).
93 Id. at 131.
94 Id. at 134.
95 Id. at 133-34.
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tions themselves. 96  In determining whether eviction is
appropriate in a particular case, the PHA can consider several
factors, including:
the seriousness of the offending action, the extent
of participation by the leaseholder in the offend-
ing action, the effects that the eviction would have
on family members not involved in the offending
activity, and the extent to which the leaseholder
has shown personal responsibility and has taken
all reasonable steps to prevent or mitigate the of-
fending action.97
B. Exclusionary Policies in the Section 8 Voucher Program
Exclusionary policies are of equal importance in the Section 8
program. As the public housing stock grows smaller, more and
more applicants must turn to Section 8 vouchers to secure hous-
ing.98 Unfortunately, extremely long waiting lists are also char-
acteristic of the Section 8 program.99 Facing the same pressure
as traditional public housing to narrow their waitlists and pro-
mote the safety of other tenants,100 the federal government also
established guidelines for admission into the Section 8 voucher
program.101 According to government policy, "tenant screening
and selection is the responsibility of the landlord;" however,
PHAs are still encouraged to screen tenants, because they have
96 Throughout the statute, permissive language is used. It is said that certain
offenses "permit" or are "grounds" for eviction or termination of tenancy,
but not that these offenses mandate termination. 24 C.F.R. § 966.4 (2003).
97 24 C.F.R. § 966.4(l)(5)(vii)(B) (2003); Rucker, 535 U.S. at 134. (listing the
factors to consider, including the crime level at the housing project, the sever-
ity of the crime in question, and whether the tenant tried to prevent the oc-
currence of the crime. Id.
98 See supra, notes 40-59 and accompanying text.
99 National Coalition for the Homeless, Federal Housing Assistance Pro-
grams, http://www.nationalhomeless.org/factsheets/federal.html.
100 See supra note 58.
101 42 U.S.C. § 1437f(d)(1)(A) (2000).
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more resources at their disposal.102 This means that not only will
local PHAs have the authority to develop admissions criteria
that will apply to voucher holders,103 but ex-offenders and their
families will face the additional obstacle of approval by the
property owner.10 4
[L]andlords who participate in the Section 8 pro-
gram are free to use their own screening devices,
which can be even more stringent than the federal
rules. There would appear to be nothing to pre-
vent a private landlord from saying that he or she
will not accept Section 8 voucher holders who
have convictions for even minor offenses.105
Section 8 landlords are entitled to criminal background infor-
mation as well. After a request by the owner is made, the PHA
within the landlord's jurisdiction will access the criminal records
and "perform determinations for the owner regarding screening,
lease enforcement and eviction based on criteria supplied by the
owner."106
Because private landlords often use the same admissions re-
quirements as PHAs, Section 8 vouchers are not a realistic alter-
native to traditional housing projects. "[I]t is unlikely that a
privately managed program like Section 8 would work effec-
tively with [ex-offenders]."107 Ex-offender applicants seeking
102 HUD, Section 8, supra note 37, at 6, 12.
103 42 U.S.C. § 1437f(d)(1)(A) (2000) ("To be eligible to receive assistance
under this subsection, a family shall, at the time a family initially receives
assistance under this subsection, be . .. a low-income family that meets eligi-
bility criteria specified by the public housing agency.").
104 42 U.S.C. § 1437f(d)(1)(A) ("[T]he selection of tenants shall be the func-
tion of the owner.").
105 John J. Ammann, Criminal Records of the Poor and Their Effects on Eli-
gibility for Affordable Housing, 9 J. AFFORDABLE Hous. & COMm. DEV. L.
222, 225 (2000).
106 42 U.S.C. § 1437d(q)(1)(B) (2000); 24 C.F.R. § 5.903(d) (2003). The
PHA's authority to access records was discussed in the previous section. See
supra text accompanying notes 63-64.
107 Williams, supra note 5, at 436 n.188.
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Section 8 housing will first have to meet the eligibility require-
ments set forth by their local housing authority. 08 For many ap-
plicants with criminal records, this will be impossible.109 If,
however, they are able to qualify under PHA requirements, they
will be placed on a long waitlist and may ultimately be denied by
private landlords based on the very same criminal record." 0
II. THE EFFICACY OF Ex-OFFENDER EXCLUSIONS
An analysis of exclusionary housing policies must take into
account the effect of such policies on both the applicants them-
selves and the current residents within public housing develop-
ments. As previously discussed, PHA regulations denying
admission to ex-offenders affects a significant proportion of the
population in need of public housing."' In enacting these poli-
cies, HUD and the PHAs are implicitly valuing the public safety
of other tenants over the ex-offenders' need for housing.112 This
section will detail why ex-offenders are some of those most in
need of public housing. I also argue that the goal of public safety
fails to justify these exclusionary practices and ex-offenders' ac-
cess to public housing should prevail over such considerations.
108 See supra Part I(A)(1) for a discussion of the eligibility requirements set
forth by PHAs in accordance with federal guidelines.
109 Williams, supra note 5, at 436 n.188.
110 See Ammann, supra note 105, at 225.
111 URBAN INSTITUTE JUSTICE POLICY CENTER, TAKING STOCK: HOUSING,
HOMELESSNESS, AND PRISONER REENTRY ii-iii (2004), http://www.urban.org/
UploadedPDF/411096 taking-stock.pdf [hereinafter URBAN INSTITUTE,
TAKING STOCK] (describing the variety of housing challenges faced by pris-
oners attempting to return to their communities).
112 No Second Chance, supra note 17, at 554.
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A. Ex-Offenders' Desperate Need for Public Housing
Over 600,000 state and federal prisoners are released each
year, in addition to the 10 million released from local jails.113 A
majority of these released prisoners are considered low-in-
come,114 and around 10% were homeless when they entered
prison."s These ex-offenders "return to their communities with
fewer resources and more needs than when they left."116 Most
people intuitively understand that ex-offenders are some of the
neediest public housing applicants. However, the situation is
more serious than many may think.
Ex-offenders face major challenges in acquiring housing that
goes beyond the typical affordability issues faced by other low-
income families.117 Because they were not income earners while
incarcerated, they typically lack the funds necessary to pay rent
113 URBAN INSTITUTE, TAKING STOCK, supra note 111, at ii (discussing the
large increase in the number of prisoners released over the last few decades);
see also URBAN INSTITUTE JUSTICE POLICY CENTER, UNDERSTANDING THE
CHALLENGES OF PRISONER REENTRY: RESEARCH FINDINGS FROM THE UR-
BAN INSTITUTE'S PRISONER REENTRY PORTFOLIO 2 (2006), http://www.
urban.org/url.cfm?ID=411289 [hereinafter URBAN INSTITUTE, PRISONER RE-
ENTRY PORTFOLIO] (estimating the number of prisoners released in 2003 to
be as many as 650,000).
114 David Kane & Joy Moses, A Second Chance: Key Anti-Poverty Law En-
acted to Fight Recidivism, Apr. 10, 2008, http://www.americanprogress.org/
issues/2008/04/poverty-law.html (providing statistics on the demographics of
prisoners re-entering their communities and the barriers they typically face).
115 PRISONER REENTRY AND CRIME IN AMERICA 26 (Jeremy Travis &
Christy Ann Visher eds., Cambridge Univ. Press 2005) [hereinafter CRIME IN
AMERICA] (describing the make-up of the current U.S. state and federal pris-
oner population). The 10% statistic refers to those prisoners entering into
state prisons; the number of federal prisoners that were homeless before con-
viction is 4.9%. An additional 4.8% of prisoners at the state level and 2.2%
of prisoners at the federal level were considered to be in "unstable housing at
[the] time of arrest." Id.
116 HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, No SECOND CHANCE: PEOPLE WITH CRIMINAL
RECORDS DENIED ACCESS TO PUBLIC HOUSING 2 (2004).
117 URBAN INSTITUTE, PRISONER REENTRY PORTFOLIO, supra note 113, at 8
("The process of obtaining housing is often complicated by a host of factors:
the scarcity of affordable and available housing, legal barriers and regula-
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or put down a deposit.118 These prisoners return to their commu-
nities jobless, and many do not have a high school diploma to
assist in acquiring stable employment.119 Additionally, most em-
ployers inquire into applicants' past criminal history and often
reject applicants based on past convictions or arrests that bear
little to no relationship to the job itself.120
Most states permit employers to deny jobs across
the board to anyone who has been convicted of a
crime or a certain category of crime, without con-
sidering the circumstances of the offense, its rele-
vance to the job, the amount of time that has
elapsed, the job being sought, evidence of rehabili-
tation, or the "business necessity" for barring the
applicant, in potential violation of [Equal Employ-
ment Opportunity Commission] guidelines.121
tions, prejudices that restrict tenancy for this population, and strict eligibility
requirements for federally subsidized housing.").
118 JEREMY TRAVIS, AMY L. SOLOMON, & MICHELLE WAUL, FROM PRISON
To HOME: THE DIMENSIONS AND CONSEQUENCES OF PRISONER REENTRY 35
(2001) [hereinafter TRAVIS, ET AL, PRISON To HOME].
119 JOAN PETERSILIA, WHEN PRISONERS COME HOME 21 (Oxford Univ.
Press 2003) (listing the demographic of U.S. prisoners, including employment
statistics); CRIME IN AMERICA, supra note 115, at 25 (providing a breakdown
of employment statistics between state and federal prisoners); see also UR-
BAN INSTITUTE, PRISONER REENTRY PORTFOLIO, supra note 113, at 2
(describing returning prisoners as having "limited marketable work experi-
ence [and] low levels of educational or vocational skills" that impair their
ability to find employment).
120 Roadblocks to Reentry, supra note 69. According to Legal Action Center,
38 states allow employers to consider arrests that do not lead to conviction.
Id.
121 Roadblocks to Reentry, supra note 69. The Equal Employment Opportu-
nity Commission requires a "business justification" for application denial
based on a prior arrest, and a "business necessity" for denials based on prior
convictions. Id. This is made worse by the fact that most states do not exer-
cise their power to grant certificates of rehabilitation, meant to remove many
of the roadblocks typically burdening ex-offenders in the case of offenders
who have shown evidence of rehabilitation. Id.
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Some ex-offenders who are able to find employment are further
burdened by state laws that prevent them from obtaining driv-
ers' licenses.122 These laws are sometimes imposed even when
the conviction is unrelated to driving, and not all states offer
restricted licenses that allow travel for work-related purposes.123
Ex-offenders' financial situations may be worsened by laws
that ban ex-offenders from various types of public assistance,
such as welfare. Federal law bans the provision of welfare bene-
fits and food stamps to anyone who has committed a drug-re-
lated state or federal felony.124 States may opt out of the law,
known as the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity
Reconciliation Act of 1996,125 but 17 states have fully adopted
it.126 The removal of the welfare benefits safety net means that
ex-offenders have even less means available to procure afforda-
ble housing.
Even if a returning prisoner was able to pay for private hous-
ing, many private landlords refuse to rent to ex-offenders. 127
Some landlords refuse to rent to ex-offenders, because they are
afraid they will be held liable for the ex-offenders' future crimi-
122 Roadblocks to Reentry, supra note 69; see also Nora V. Demleitner, "Col-
lateral Damage": No Re-Entry for Drug Offenders, 47 VILL. L. REv. 1027,
1037 (2002) [hereinafter Demleitner, Collateral Damage]. States have en-
acted these laws under pressure from the federal government. Ten percent of
highway funds may be withheld if the state does not revoke or suspend the
drivers license of an individual convicted of a drug-related offense. Road-
blocks to Reentry, supra note 69.
123 Roadblocks to Reentry, supra note 69 (discussing the restrictive licenses
that are available in 40 states for work, employment, and attending drug
treatment programs).
124 Deborah N. Archer & Kele S. Williams, Making America "The Land of
Second Chances": Restoring Socioeconomic Rights for Ex-Offenders, 30
N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 527, 539 (2006).
125 Id.
126 Roadblocks to Reentry, supra note 69 (listing the seventeen states that
have adopted the law in full form, the twelve states who have fully opted out,
and explaining how the remaining states have provided that ex-offenders
may receive benefits if they fulfill certain requirements).
127 Demleitner, Collateral Damage, supra note 122, at 1036; supra Part I(B).
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nal acts.128 While the general rule is that a private landlord can-
not be held responsible for crimes committed by tenants on the
premises, some successful claims have been brought when it can
be shown that the landlord knew of the tenant's "dangerous-
ness."129 From the perspective of private landlords, many ex-of-
fenders simply pose too great a risk.
Unable to afford or acquire housing in the private rental sec-
tor, "publicly supported housing is the only realistic option for
[ex-offenders to find] safe and stable places to live."o30 Individu-
als' status as ex-offenders diminishes the likelihood that they
can afford private housing due to employment restrictions, and
it attaches a social stigma that results in the unwillingness of
landlords to rent to them. As a result, approximately 10% of
prisoners returning home wind up homeless;' 3 ' in urban areas,
this percentage increases anywhere from 30 to 50%.132
Denying housing to ex-offenders, people who are otherwise
incapable of finding acceptable housing options, directly con-
flicts with the federal government's goal of providing decent
homes for Americans in need.as Instead, exclusionary admis-
128 Heidi Lee Cain, Housing Our Criminals: Finding Housing for the Ex-
Offender in the Twenty-First Century, 33 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REv. 131,
149-50 (2003) (identifying the fears of some private landlords that they will
be held liable for renting to tenants if they knew of any criminal
propensities).
129 B.A. Glesner, Landlords as Cops: Tort, Nuisance & Forfeiture Standards
Imposing Liability on Landlords for Crime on the Premises. 42 CASE W. RES.
L. REV. 679, 711 (1992).
130 No Second Chance, supra note 17, at 552.
131 URBAN INSTITUTE, TAKING STOCK, supra note 111 (comparing the num-
ber of ex-offenders who are homeless before incarceration to the number
who are homeless after release and estimating that both are approximately
10%).
132 TRAVIS, ET AL, PRISON TO HOME, supra note 118, at 36 (providing Los
Angeles and San Francisco as examples of urban areas with larger ex-of-
fender populations).
133 See Housing Act of 1937, Pub. L. No. 75-412, 50 Stat. 888 (1937) (current
version at 42 U.S.C. § 1437 (2006)); Housing Act of 1949, Pub. L. No. 81-171,
63 Stat. 413 (1949).
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sion policies are justified based on the goal of protecting the
safety of other public housing tenants.134 Public housing projects
are well-known havens for crime, gang warfare, and drug deal-
ing.13 5 Although national statistics on the extent of crime in
housing projects are unavailable, within some housing projects
crime is more pervasive than in the surrounding communities.136
Although the majority of public housing projects are safe,'37 the
amount of crime in public housing became the source of na-
tional attention during the 1990s due to the proliferation of
drug-related crime and the escalation in the "War on Drugs."138
B. Balancing Safety and Need- A Closer Look
Promoting the safety of residents is undoubtedly a legitimate
and appropriate goal for HUD and PHAs. Exclusionary admis-
sion policies do not adequately accomplish this goal, because
they are overbroad and fail to address a myriad of more impor-
134 No Second Chance, supra note 17, at 563. But see Id., at 564 (suggesting
that these policies are also in place for two other reasons: 1) the "belief in the
United States that people who have broken the law do not deserve a second
chance," and 2) because they provide a "politically cost-free" way to relieve
some of the pressure on the already stressed housing supply).
'35 Robyn Minter Smyers, High Noon in Public Housing: The Showdown
Between Due Process Rights and Good Management Practices in the War on
Drugs and Crime, 30 URB. LAW. 573, 573-74 (1998) (discussing the dangers
of public housing projects in the United States and the national debate over
how to handle these dangers); see also Schill, Distressed Housing, supra note
23, at 497.
136 Jason S. Thaler, Public Housing Consent Clauses: Unconstitutional Condi-
tion or Constitutional Necessity, 63 FORDHAM L. REV. 1777, 1782 n.37 (1995)
(describing the limited data available on crime in public housing projects);
see also Jeffrey Fagan, Garth Davies & Jan Holland, The Paradox of the Drug
Elimination Program in New York City Public Housing, 13 GEo. J. ON Pov-
ERTY L. & POL'Y 415, 416 (2006) (describing the disparity in crime rates be-
tween public housing and other contexts).
137 Smyers, supra note 135, at 577; Schill, Distressed Housing, supra note 23,
at 501.
138 Fagan, et al., supra note 136.
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tant sources of crime in public housing projects. 139 Further, they
push ex-offenders toward recidivism. 14 0
1. The Truth about Recidivism
Current exclusionary admission policies are overbroad in both
the type of offenses they cover and the number of applicants
they exclude. Some exclusionary admission policies do not pro-
tect resident safety, because there is often only a "tenuous rela-
tionship" between the offending behavior and the safety of
other residents.141 These policies are contrary to the HUD man-
date, because they "cover individuals who may pose no current
danger, but who happen to have criminal histories." 142 For ex-
ample, policies that exclude prospective residents for minor
non-violent offenses, such as writing bad checks or shoplifting,
do not relate to the safety of other public housing tenants.143
Similarly, the Seattle Housing Authority policy, mentioned
above, denying admission to former prostitutes does not en-
hance the safety of Seattle Housing Authority residents.144 An
applicant who has only written a bad check or has been con-
victed of a single prostitution offense cannot reasonably be pre-
139 Shill, Distressed Housing, supra note 23, at 507 (arguing that the physical
distress of public housing units and the concentration of the poor leads to
social disorder).
140 No Second Chance, supra note 17, at 546. (discussing how denying ex-
offenders housing can be counter-productive for the communities they will
return to). As previously discussed, a large number of prisoners returning
home would otherwise be eligible for public housing because they are low
income individuals. Because these individuals will likely be returning to low-
income urban areas, and these are the areas where the housing projects are
located, any resulting recidivism will affect the housing projects' communi-
ties. See Schill, Distressed Housing, supra note 23, at 504 for a discussion of
how public housing projects came to be developed in low-income urban
areas.
141 No Second Chance, supra note 17, at 546.
142 Pinard, Offender Reentry, supra note 58, at 594-95.
143 No Second Chance, supra note 17, at 567-68.
144 See supra note 78 and accompanying text.
Volume), Number 2
DePaul Journal for Social Justice 198
Spring zolo0
26
DePaul Journal for Social Justice, Vol. 3, Iss. 2 [2016], Art. 4
https://via.library.depaul.edu/jsj/vol3/iss2/4
sumed a safety risk to other public housing tenants. Therefore,
safety concerns cannot adequately justify these broad exclusion-
ary policies.
Moreover, exclusionary admission policies that automatically
bar applicants for a specific number of years are overbroad, be-
cause they exclude many applicants unlikely to repeat offend.145
Studies show that approximately two-thirds of released prison-
ers are arrested for another offense within three years.146
Around 46% of those arrests will result in another conviction.147
While at first glance, this statistic seems to support exclusionary
housing policies, a further look at recidivism statistics highlights
the need for an individualized review of ex-offender housing ap-
plicants. First, two-thirds of all recidivist offenses occur within
the first year following release, so the majority of ex-offenders
who recidivate will do so within the first year of their release.148
Of these recidivist offenses, ex-offenders rearrested during the
first year are typically arrested for property offenses, rather than
violent offenses, undercutting the premise that such individuals
pose safety risks in the future. 149 Exclusionary housing policies
imposing elongated time bars ignore this fact. Because an appli-
cant who has been crime-free for at least one year is far less
likely to commit another crime than overall recidivism statistics
suggest, housing bars that prevent admission for periods of over
145 See supra notes 73-80 and accompanying text (providing examples of
some automatic time bars imposed by housing authorities across the
country).
146 BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, RECIDIVISM OF PRISONERS RELEASED
IN 1994, at 1, available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/rpr94.pdf; see
also, e.g., URBAN INSTITUTE, PRISONER REENTRY PORTFOLIO, supra note
113, at 2.; URBAN INSTITUTE, TAKING STOCK, supra note 111, at iii.
147 BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, supra note 146 at 1.
148 BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, supra note 146, at 3; URBAN INSTITUTE,
TAKING STOCK, supra note 111, at iii.
149 URBAN INSTITUTE, TAKING STOCK, supra note 111, at 12.
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one year are overly restrictive.1 5 0 The applicant who has been
crime-free for at least one year should not be held to the same
admission standard as another ex-offender applicant, because he
has shown his ability to be a law-abiding citizen. Although HUD
envisions application review on a case-by-case basis, taking into
account factors such as remoteness in time,15 the automatic
time bars put in place by many PHAs run contrary to this
ideal.152 The imposition of a three-year bar on admission of indi-
viduals convicted of drug-related misdemeanors in Cleveland,
Ohio housing authorities,153 for example, unnecessarily burdens
many ex-offenders who would not re-offend or pose a safety
risk. Automatic exclusions without individualized review are
problematic, as they affect too many non-violent ex-offenders to
be justified by a marginal or non-existent safety benefit.
Because exclusionary admission policies do not address the
many causes of violence in public housing, safety in the public
housing projects is not substantially improved. For example,
many argue that there is a link between the physically distressed
state of public housing and social disorder and crime.154 Deterio-
rated housing units with "leaky roofs, broken plumbing, and in-
sufficient heat" diminish tenants' quality of life, thus increasing
the likelihood of criminal behavior. 55 Units that are too dilapi-
dated to rent are left vacant. These "units are vandalized and
frequently used for illegal purposes, such as drug distribution or
consumption."156 This argument is similar to the "broken win-
dows theory" used by Mayor Rudy Giuliani in New York City
150 See supra notes 73-80 and accompanying text (providing examples of
some automatic time bars imposed by housing authorities across the country,
many of which are longer than one year).
151 See supra note 64.
152 See supra notes 73-80.
153 Roadblocks to Reentry, supra note 69.
154 Schill, Distressed Housing, supra note 23, at 507.
15s Id.
156 Id.
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during the 1990s to develop a strategy to reduce crime.157 This
theory posits that signs of societal abandonment, such as broken
windows, encourage vandalism by others, even "people who or-
dinarily would not dream of doing such things and who probably
consider themselves law-abiding."158 Further, abandonment and
vandalism leads to the "breakdown of community controls."1 59
This suggests that crime in public housing projects is less a prod-
uct of admitted residents than of the physical state of the
projects themselves. Therefore, policies excluding certain indi-
viduals from public housing will not increase safety because the
physical state of the units will encourage criminal behavior, even
in those individuals who would not otherwise be criminally-
inclined.
The concentration of poverty, characteristic of most urban
public housing projects,16o and poor management by public
housing authoritiesl 61 have also been blamed for public hous-
ing's violence and social disorder. Exclusionary admissions poli-
cies, by themselves, do not address these causes. Denying
admission to ex-offenders does little, if anything, to reduce the
concentration of poverty within a housing project, and these
policies certainly do not affect PHA management.
2. Danger of Exclusionary Policies
Most problematically, exclusionary admissions policies actu-
ally decrease safety in housing project communities. Studies
have shown that returning prisoners who cannot find housing
157 Fagan, et al., supra note 136, at 426 (addressing the policy in New York
City to decrease crime by addressing "minor disorders such as public drunk-
enness and loitering, and concentrat[ing] on neighborhoods with visible signs
of non-criminal disorder, such as empty lots, abandoned cars, and dilapidated
buildings").
158 James Q. Wilson & George L. Kelling, Broken Windows: The Police and
Neighborhood Safety, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Mar. 1982, at 29, 31.
159 Id.
160 Schill, Distressed Housing, supra note 23, at 507.
161 Smyers, supra note 135, at 574.
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are more prone to repeat offenses. 162 "Indeed, an ex-offender's
inability to access subsidized housing 'significantly diminishe[s]'
her ability 'to obtain and retain employment and [to] remain
drug- and crime-free.' "1 6 3 Housing is inextricably linked with
self-sufficiency, and "the tension and despair that bad housing
can cause makes it extraordinarily difficult for persons forced to
live in bad housing to rise above the circumstances of their sur-
roundings."164 Because many prisoners will return to communi-
ties that include public housing projects, these projects may
suffer the consequences of the increased likelihood of recidi-
vism. For example, the majority of prisoners in Chicago move to
some of Chicago's poorest neighborhoods, also home to many
of the CHA's remaining housing projects.165
Exclusionary admissions policies are contrary to the general
goal of public housing of providing a safety net for low-income
Americans. These policies imply that ex-offenders do not de-
serve housing support.166 By denying admission to ex-offenders,
PHAs value their responsibility to protect the safety of other
162 Archer & Williams, supra note 124, at 542-43; Demleitner, Collateral
Damage, supra note 122, at 1028 ("[Clommon sense indicates that depriving
individuals access to legitimate means of survival contributes to higher rates
of recidivism.").
163 Archer & Williams, supra note 124, at 543 (quoting Gwen Rebinstein &
Debbie Mukamal, Welfare and Housing-Denial of Benefits to Drug Offend-
ers, in INVISIBLE PUNISHMENT: THE COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES OF MASS
IMPRISONMENT 37, 48 (Marc Mauer & Meda Chesney-Lind eds., 2002)) (al-
terations in original).
164 Salsich, supra note 6, at 51.
165 URBAN INSTITUTE, CHICAGO PRISONERS' EXPERIENCEs RETURNING
HOME 5 (2004), available at http://www.urban.org/url.cfm?ID=311115 [here-
inafter URBAN INSTITUTE, CHICAGO PRISONERS] (stating that approximately
1/3 of Chicago's returning prisoners move to six of Chicago's poorest neigh-
borhoods, including Austin, Humboldt Park, North Lawndale, Englewood,
West Englewood, and East Garfield Park). The neighborhood of Englewood,
for example, is home to two of Chicago's public housing projects and is
within a short distance of many more projects, including the Robert Taylor
Homes. For a map of Chicago plotting the location the CHA's housing
projects, see cha.org, Housing, http://www.thecha.org/pages/housing/19.php.
166 No Second Chance, supra note 17, at 554.
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residents over their duty to act as the housing option of last re-
sort for America's destitute. This raises particularly troubling is-
sues because of the questions regarding the actual effect of these
policies on the safety of public housing projects. Exclusionary
admissions policies fail to address some of the most commonly
recognized causes of violence and social disorder in public hous-
ing, including the concentration of poverty in these projects,
poor management by PHAs, and the deterioration of the physi-
cal state of these buildings. Further, these policies potentially
decrease the safety of housing projects, because prisoners re-
turning to those communities are more likely to recidivate if
they do not have stable housing. 167 Exclusionary admissions pol-
icies that are only tenuously related to the safety of other re-
sidents should be repealed, not only because they are of dubious
efficacy, but also, extremely harmful to a large number of Amer-
icans in need of housing assistance.
III. EXCLUSIONARY POLICIES AS PUNITIVE
COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES
Part II showed that current PHA admission policies exclude
one of the neediest groups of American citizens from publicly
assisted housing. These policies seek to promote the safety of
the remaining housing tenants, but for various reasons, they may
not accomplish that goal.168 As such, given their minimal impact
on the overall safety of the housing projects and the vast puni-
tive impact on the lives of a growing number of ex-offenders,
can these policies be justified? This section discusses the puni-
tive nature of the exclusionary policies and analyzes these poli-
cies in light of different theories of punishment.
167 Archer and Williams, supra note 124, at 542-43.
168 See supra Part II (discussing how exclusionary admissions policies do not
solve the crime problems in public housing because they do not address
crime rates in the surrounding communities, management problems, and the
physical state of disrepair of these projects, in addition to the risk they create
of pushing ex-offenders toward recidivism).
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Exclusionary admission policies are collateral consequences
of crimes. Because these consequences constitute civil, rather
than criminal, sanctions, they are "imposed without the protec-
tions and guarantees of the criminal justice system."169 Despite
their civil nature, however, these collateral consequences are in-
herently punitive, because they are a direct and automatic con-
sequence of the crime. Additionally, they are typically justified
using the same theories of punishment used in criminal sentenc-
ing decisions.170 The primary theories of punishment are inca-
pacitation, retribution, rehabilitation, denunciation, and
deterrence.171 Although it is generally accepted that punishment
may only be justified if "some combination" of the theories sup-
port the punishment,172 exclusionary admissions policies do not
succeed under any of the aforementioned theories.17 3
A. Incapacitation
Incapacitation is the primary justification for exclusionary ad-
mission policies.174 ThiS theory suggests that punishment of
criminals is supported by the reduction in crime resulting from
the individuals' imprisonment. 75 In the context of criminal sen-
169 Demleitner, Collateral Damage, supra note 122, at 1032.
170 Id. ("Collateral consequences are justified either on punitive, deterrent
or preventative grounds."). As previously discussed, the most common justi-
fication for exclusionary admissions policies is that it will protect other public
housing tenants. This is, essentially, the incapacitation theory of punishment.
171 See e.g., Carissa Byrne Hessick, Motive's Role in Punishment, 80 S. CAL.
L. REV. 89, 112 (2006); Ronald J. Rychlak, Society's Moral Right to Punish: A
Further Exploration of the Denunciation Theory of Punishment, 65 TUL. L.
REV. 299, 300-301 (1990).
172 Hessick, supra note 171, at 112.
173 Nora V. Demleitner, Preventing Internal Exile: The Need for Restrictions
on Collateral Sentencing Consequences, 11 STAN. L. & POL'Y REV. 153, 154
(1999) [hereinafter Demleitner, Preventing Internal Exile].
174 Id. at 161.
175 Note, Selective Incapacitation: Reducing Crime Through Predictions of
Recidivism, 96 HARV. L. REV. 511, 512 (1982) [hereinafter Selective
Incapacitation].
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tencing, criminals may be imprisoned because society will be
safer with them off of the streets. In terms of public housing, the
theory is that public housing developments will be safer if these
individuals are excluded. However, as discussed in Part II, this
reasoning fails in the case of exclusionary housing policies.176
Ex-offenders often return to neighborhoods with housing devel-
opments.177 Refusing housing to ex-offenders does not keep
criminals off of the streets but relegates criminals to homeless-
ness, increasing the likelihood of recidivism.1s As such, exclu-
sionary admission policies fail to keep ex-offenders away from
public housing developments while increasing their potential
dangerousness and decreasing the overall safety of the
neighborhood.
Research completed on one branch of the incapacitation the-
ory, selective incapacitation, provides more insight into the inef-
ficiency of these exclusionary admission policies. "Selective
incapacitation theory asserts that the effect of imprisonment on
street crime is a direct function of the rate at which incarcerated
offenders would have committed crimes if they were not con-
fined."179 It focuses on the societal benefits that would come
from imprisoning "career criminals" for extended periods of
time. The success of this punishment strategy, however, depends
on the ability to predict who will be a "career criminal," or re-
cidivist.o80 Because exclusionary admission policies exclude ex-
offenders to protect tenants from the potential future acts of
these individuals, they are necessarily predictive in nature. Thus,
the statistics from selective incapacitation and recidivist studies
are particularly relevant to an analysis of exclusionary housing
policies.
176 See supra notes 162-65 and accompanying text.
177 URBAN INSTITUTE, CHICAGO PRISONERS, supra note 165 and accompa-
nying text.
178 See supra notes 162-65 and accompanying text.
179 Selective Incapacitation, supra note 175, at 512.
180 Id. at 511.
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These studies show that several factors incorporated in the ex-
clusionary admission policies of many PHAs are not good in-
dicators of future criminal behavior. An Institute for Law and
Social Research study illustrates that arrest of individuals with-
out a previous criminal record for a misdemeanor drug offense
does not reliably predict future recidivism.18 ' Another study
shows that prior prison sentences and prior felony convictions
are "poor predictors of an offender's level of criminal activ-
ity." 182 Many PHAs deny admission to applicants with a single
drug offense or felony based on the presumption that these of-
fenses indicate a high likelihood of future criminal conduct.183
These studies indicate that this premise is unsound, if not defi-
nitely false. Therefore, exclusionary admission policies cannot
be justified by the incapacitation theory.
B. Retribution
The retribution theory holds that an offender should be pun-
ished because their actions were blameworthy and deserving of
punishment.184 However, the criminal punishments imposed on
ex-offenders, such as prison time or the imposition of a fine, al-
ready reflects the offenders' "just deserts." By the time the ex-
offenders are applying for housing, they "have paid their debt to
society." 185 Collateral consequences only serve to punish ex-of-
fenders more than the jury believed they deserved. Further, the
181 Id. at 516 n.27 (describing "an arrest for a misdemeanor drug offense
when the defendant had had no prior criminal record" as having "a negative
correlation with recidivism").
182 Id. at 517 n.37 (detailing the findings of the Rand Corporation's Habitual
Offender Project).
183 Illinois, Virginia, and Washington are just some of the states whose PHAs
use single drug offenses or felony convictions to bar applicants for a term of
years. Roadblocks to Reentry, supra note 69.
184 Hessick, supra note 171, at 113 (describing retribution theory).
185 Ben Geiger, The Case for Treating Ex-Offenders As a Suspect Class, 94
CAL. L. REV. 1191, 1220 (2006); see also Demleitner, Preventing Internal Ex-
ile, supra note 173, at 160.
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principle of proportionality is central to retribution theory, as
punishments are to be allotted proportionally, reflecting the se-
verity of the crime committed.186 Collateral consequences, such
as exclusionary housing policies, are typically not proportional;
rather, they are applied without being "calibrated specifically to
the offense and the offender's background."187 For example,
PHA policies that ban admission of all applicants who have
been convicted of a felony within the last five years fail to con-
sider any individual difference between applicants.188 Blanket
denials such as these do not proportionally reflect society's as-
sessment of the proper punishment for the crime committed.
C. Rehabilitation
The rehabilitation theory focuses on punishing criminals in or-
der to rid them of their criminal propensities and reduce the
likelihood of future criminal behavior.189 This theory cannot be
used to justify collateral consequences, such as exclusionary
housing policies, for similar reasons as those establishing the in-
sufficiency of the incapacitation theory. "There is widespread
agreement that collateral sentencing consequences do not serve
a rehabilitative function and may even actively thwart attempts
at rehabilitation by preventing the ex-offender's reintegration
186 Hessick, supra note 171, at 113. ("The amount of punishment must be
proportional to the punishment assigned to other similar (and dissimilar) of-
fenses, and the amount of punishment must also be in proportion to the grav-
ity of the offense itself.").
187 Demleitner, Preventing Internal Exile, supra note 173, at 160.
188 No Second Chance, supra note 17, at 546.
189 Hessick, supra note 171, at 119. Once the primary justification for crimi-
nal punishment, rehabilitation has become less popular in the last few de-
cades because of the general distaste for the indeterminate sentencing that
was seen as a byproduct of rehabilitation theory. See generally Michael Vi-
tiello, Reconsidering Rehabilitation, 65 TUL. L. REV. 1011 (1991).
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into society."190 Denying housing to ex-offenders creates a bar-
rier to reintegration, leading to increased recidivism rates.191
D. Denunciation
"The denunciation theory of punishment says that those who
disobey criminal laws should be held up to the rest of society
and denounced as violators of the rules that define what the so-
ciety represents."192 Exclusionary housing policies certainly
shame ex-offenders. It remains unclear, however, whether the
rest of society believes that these ex-offenders should be treated
this way. An Urban Institute of Chicago study of communities
that house a large number of the city's returning prisoners indi-
cates that members of these communities may actually be sym-
pathetic toward ex-offenders.193 In fact, these residents often felt
that these ex-offenders were not responsible for crime in their
communities.194 For the denunciation theory to operate prop-
erly, the values imposed on the shamed individual should reflect
the values of society as a whole. Therefore, it is important to
determine whether Americans believe exclusionary housing pol-
icies properly, rather than needlessly, shame the individual.
At the heart of the denunciation theory is the ability of ex-
offenders to reintegrate into society.195 However, exclusionary
admission policies fail to follow the denunciation theory because
they do not provide ex-offenders with a realistic way to reinte-
190 Demleitner, Preventing Internal Exile, supra note 173, at 160.
191 See supra notes 162-65 and accompanying text.
192 Rychlak, supra note 171, at 331.
193 URBAN INSTITUTE, CHICAGO PRISONERS, supra note 165, at 15. It should
be noted that the individuals surveyed "were personally acquainted with at
least one released prisoner, and the vast majority had close relatives and/or
friends in the penal system." Additionally, these individuals acknowledged
that the rest of their community might feel differently toward ex-offenders.
Id.
194 URBAN INSTITUTE, CHICAGO PRISONERS, supra note 165, at 15.
195 Demleitner, Preventing Internal Exile, supra note 173, at 160.
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grate. 196 Lifetime bars for offenses, such as the production of
methamphetamines, permanently denounce offenders. 197 More
commonly, bars on admission do not last for the extent of the
ex-offender's lifetime,198 but they still last longer than the one-
year period during which the offender is most likely to
recidivate.199
E. Deterrence
Criminal punishments are often justified based on their deter-
rent value. Under the deterrence theory, punishment is imposed
to discourage future criminal conduct.200 Specific deterrence is
designed to discourage recidivism, while general deterrence is
designed to discourage the rest of the population from commit-
ting the same offense.201 The most common criticism of deter-
rence theory is that most crimes are committed under impulse
and without a rational weighing of consequences. 202 Addition-
ally, it is unlikely that exclusionary admission policies accom-
plish an actual deterrent effect, because collateral consequences
are only a proportionally small addition to the overall criminal
punishment,203 and marginal increases in punishment typically
do not decrease the number of crimes committed.204 If a term of
imprisonment is unable to deter an individual from committing
196 Id. ("Denunciation does not aim at permanent exclusion but rather at
reintegrating the offender into society after shaming her. Collateral conse-
quences, on the other hand, stigmatize the offender . .. and frequently make
it impossible for her ever to regain full societal membership.").
197 See supra notes 67 and 68.
198 See supra notes 73-80 and accompanying text.
199 BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICs, supra note 146, at 3.
200 Hessick, supra note 171, at 115 ("Deterrence is the notion that the threat
or fear of punishment will result in law abiding behavior.").
201 Id.
202 Id.at 116; Demleitner, Preventing Internal Exile, supra note 173, at 161
("[P]otential offenders do not usually weigh the costs and benefits of their
actions.").
203 Demleitner, Preventing Internal Exile, supra note 173, at 161.
204 Hessick, supra note 171, at 116.
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a given crime, it is unlikely that a bar from public housing assis-
tance will provide that incentive.
The lack of deterrent effect is compounded by the fact that
collateral consequences are generally unknown to the public.205
Individuals unaware that they could lose their eligibility for pub-
lic housing are incapable of factoring this consequence into their
decision making. This renders void any deterrent value of exclu-
sionary policies.
"To be justifiable, collateral sentencing consequences should
be based on sound penological goals and be narrowly circum-
scribed to accomplish these goals." 206 Exclusionary housing poli-
cies, however, cannot be justified by any of the theories of
punishment used in criminal law. Ex-offenders have already
served their time and paid their debt to society. Exclusionary
policies compound their criminal sentences without justification
and may in fact increase the likelihood of future criminal acts.
As such, these overly broad policies should be amended.
CONCLUSION
Exclusionary admission policies bar thousands of otherwise
eligible Americans from access to public housing each year.
PHAs have interpreted HUD's general directions to allow auto-
matic denials for a wide range of offenses. Many of these of-
fenses are non-violent, and bars may last for periods
unsupported by recidivism statistics. 20 7 These individuals need
housing to effectuate their successful reentry and reintegration
into society. The Section 8 program, often offered as an alterna-
205 Demleitner, Preventing Internal Exile, supra note 173, at 160; Pinard, Of-
fender Reentry, supra note 58, at 590 ("Not only offenders, but many partici-
pants in the criminal justice system remain wholly unaware of these
consequences.").
206 Demleitner, Preventing Internal Exile, supra note 173, at 160.
207 See supra notes 69-80.
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tive to traditional public housing, is not an adequate remedy be-
cause applicants face the same or stricter admission criteria.208
Because of the extensive punitive impact of these policies,
they can only be justified if they serve a sufficient penological
purpose. 209 However, the theories of deterrence, incapacitation,
rehabilitation, denunciation, and retribution cannot be used to
support these broad policies. Admission denials are counter-
productive to incapacitative and rehabilitative goals, because ex-
offenders who do not have access to decent housing are more
likely to recidivate.210 These ex-offenders have already com-
pleted the punishments allotted to them through the criminal
justice system. Without concrete evidence that prohibition of
these ex-offenders from public housing actually accomplishes a
further goal, exclusionary policies are unjust.
The safety of public housing projects is an important goal and
can be upheld through the maintenance and strengthening of
eviction policies to rid housing projects of those actually com-
mitting crimes.211 Policies that exclude applicants for prior minor
non-violent or misdemeanor drug charges alone and lengthy
time bars longer than the period within which an individual is
likely to recidivate should be repealed. Bringing offense-based
admission policies in line with recidivism statistics is likely to
keep the housing projects as safe as the current system-without
the negative and unjust consequences. Therefore, admission
bars to public housing must be limited and reasonable. More
importantly, PHAs must only institute time bars for those
crimes related to the safety of other residents and reliably pre-
dictive of future criminal behavior.
While any reform of public housing must carefully weigh
safety and accessibility, current law fails to address the root
problems afflicting public housing. Instead, PHAs unjustifiably
208 See supra Part I(B).
209 Demleitner, Preventing Internal Exile, supra note 173, at 160.
210 See supra note 162.
211 See supra Part I(A)(2).
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and mistakenly level blame at desperate ex-offenders. Too many
Americans are denied admission to public housing because of
their criminal backgrounds without sufficient justification or
consideration. Ex-offenders should not be automatic casualties
in the American affordable housing shortage crisis.
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